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POLICING, DATABASES, AND SURVEILLANCE:  
FIVE REGULATORY CATEGORIES 
 
Christopher Slobogin* 
 
 
 Databases are full of personal information that law 
enforcement might find useful. Government access to these 
databases can be divided into five categories: suspect-
driven; profile-driven; event-driven; program-driven and 
volunteer-driven. This chapter recommends that, in addition 
to any restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment (which 
currently are minimal), each type of access should be subject 
to its own regulatory regime. Suspect-driven access should 
depend on justification proportionate to the intrusion. 
Profile-driven access should likewise abide by a 
proportionality principle but should also be subject to 
transparency, vetting, and universality restrictions. Event-
driven access should be cabined by the time and place of the 
event. Program-driven access should be authorized by 
legislation and by regulations publicly arrived-at and evenly 
applied. Information maintained by institutional fiduciaries 
should not be volunteered unless necessary to forestall an 
ongoing or imminent serious wrong.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is now a commonplace that virtually everything we do is 
memorialized on databases, some of them maintained by government, some 
of them in the hands of private enterprises. These databases—which for 
ease of reference this chapter will refer to as The Cloud—reside in the 
servers of Google, Netflix and Apple; the memory banks of phones, closed-
circuit cameras, “smart cars,” and satellites; and the computers in 
government agencies and commercial establishments. They track an 
astonishing range of our intimate daily activities, including Internet usage, 
communications connections, financial transactions, travel routes, tax 
information, medical treatment, and biometric information, as well as more 
prosaic matters such as employment and residence history, utility usage, 
                                                          
* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. A version of this paper 
was published in the National Constitution Center’s White Paper Series, as Policing and 
the Cloud, available at constitutioncenter.org. 
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and car malfunctions. The question addressed here is when the government 
should be able to gain access to this wealth of personal information for law 
enforcement and national-security purposes. 
In the United States, answering that question requires consulting a 
welter of statutes and a few Supreme Court decisions. For instance, when 
the government wants to access communications stored on a computer, 
federal and state laws usually require a warrant, issued by a judge who has 
found probable cause that the communication will lead to evidence of 
wrongdoing.1 However, if officials want an opened message that is sitting 
on a server, or an unopened text that has been on a server for over 180 days, 
then they may only need to show that it is “relevant” to an investigation—a 
much lower standard than probable cause, albeit an assertion that at some 
point is challengeable by the target, as occurs with an ordinary subpoena.2 
And if the communication sits on a “private” server (belonging, say, to an 
employer), no court process is required.3  
When law enforcement officials seek records from third parties outside 
the communications context, a wide array of statutes may be applicable. As 
a general matter, bank, educational, and even medical records can be 
obtained with a mere subpoena, which the target often does not find out 
about unless and until prosecution occurs.4 In a host of other situations, 
such as accessing commercial camera footage or obtaining data about 
credit-card purchases or past travel routes, most jurisdictions do not require 
police to follow any judicial process, but rather allow them to obtain the 
information at their discretion and that of the data holders.5 When law 
enforcement seeks information from the databases of other government 
agencies, as opposed to those maintained by private entities, usually all it 
needs is a written request from the head of the enforcement agency, 
although sometimes more is required.6  
In theory, the U.S. Constitution, and in particular, the Fourth 
Amendment, could have something to say about all of this. The Fourth 
Amendment requires that the government act reasonably when it engages in 
a “search” or “seizure,” and the courts have held that, for many types of 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511 & 2518. 
2 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(B). On February 9, 2017, the House of Representatives 
unanimously voted to repeal this provision and instead require a warrant; the Senate had 
yet to vote at the time of this writing. 
3 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (defining remote computing service). 
4 For a summary, see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 174–75 (2007). 
5 See generally Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: 
Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement 
Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485 (2013). 
6 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 173 (describing the Privacy Act). 
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searches, this reasonableness requirement can only be met with a warrant. 
However, this requirement only applies to government actions that are 
considered “searches.” The Supreme Court has defined that word very 
narrowly, to encompass only those actions that infringe “reasonable 
expectations of privacy” or that involve some type of physical intrusion.7 
Most relevant here are the Court’s decisions holding that expecting 
constitutional protection from government acquisition of information 
surrendered to third parties—whether they be Internet service providers, 
banks, or phone companies—is not reasonable, since we “assume the risk” 
that those third parties will decide to give that information to the 
government.8 As discussed below, this “third party” doctrine has seen some 
erosion in recent years, but it remains the reason that, other than when 
access to the content of communications is involved,9 the Fourth 
Amendment has had very little impact on the government’s ability to obtain 
information from private databases, even when it relies on technology to do 
so.  
When instead the database is created by law enforcement, the 
Constitution may have more impact. In particular, collection of the 
information for the database may require justification. For instance, taking a 
DNA sample through a cheek swab is a Fourth Amendment search,10 and 
forcing an individual to produce self-incriminating documents can implicate 
the Fifth Amendment unless the government can identify relatively 
precisely the documents it wants.11 However, any important regulatory need 
will overcome Fourth Amendment claims that these types of data 
acquisition are unreasonable; in such cases, probable cause is not 
necessary.12 And if the information is “nontestimonial” (as is assumed to be 
the case with fingerprints and DNA13), or is “voluntarily” surrendered for 
non-criminal purposes (as is assumed to be the case with a tax return or 
                                                          
7 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (indicating that the expectation of 
privacy test established in earlier case law is supplemented by inquiry into whether the 
government “engage[s] in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area”). 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding one has no 
expectation of privacy in bank records, “even if the information is revealed on the 
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the 
third party will not be betrayed”); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (same 
holding with respect to phone numbers dialed).  
9 See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to obtain stored emails). 
10 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969–70 (2013). 
11 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000). 
12 See, e.g., King, 133 S. Ct. at 1977 (holding that the government’s need for DNA 
from arrestees outweighs the intrusion involved).  
13 See, e.g., Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 431 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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applications for government entitlements14), or is obtained from a source 
other than individual, the Fifth Amendment doesn’t apply. Finally, the 
Constitution appears to have little to say about law enforcement agencies’ 
access to the information once they or other government entities 
legitimately collect it.15  
While many have criticized the laxness of both statutory and 
constitutional law, the most popular counter-proposal—that all or most 
Cloud access by the government should require a judicial warrant—has 
problems of its own. Conceptually, a warrant requirement glosses over the 
intuition that a large number of situations, while involving a viable privacy 
claim against the government, do not merit the full protection of a judicial 
probable-cause finding. Practically, it would handcuff legitimate 
government efforts to nab terrorists and criminals. A more nuanced 
approach is probably necessary. 
That approach should begin with an assessment of the varying 
motivations that drive the government’s use of The Cloud. Cloud-based 
searches can come in at least five different guises: suspect-driven, profile-
driven, event-driven, program-driven, or volunteer-driven. Some database 
access by the state is aimed at getting as much information as possible about 
individuals suspected of wrongdoing. Other efforts do not start with a 
particular suspect, but rather with a profile of a hypothetical suspect, 
purportedly depicting the characteristics of those who have committed or 
will commit a particular sort of crime. A third type of Cloud-search starts 
neither with a suspect nor a suspect profile but with an event—usually a 
crime—and tries to figure out, through location and related information, 
who might be involved. Fourth, so as to have the information needed for 
suspect-, profile-, and event-driven operations at the ready, government 
might initiate data-collection programs. Finally, the government also relies 
on citizens to come forward on their accord when they find incriminating 
information about another person in The Cloud. 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657–58 (1976) (holding that the 
federal penalty for failing to file a tax return does not coerce answers to individual 
questions on the return, which the taxpayer can answer by asserting the privilege with 
impunity); Balt. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990) (stating that 
“the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory 
regime constructed to effect the State’s public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its 
criminal laws”).  
15 See Erin Murphy, DNA in the Criminal Justice System: A Congressional Research 
Service Report, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 340, 364 (2016) (noting that even with 
respect to accessing genetic databases that can contain extremely personal information, 
“[s]tandards surrounding the legality of both [on-demand and volunteered] disclosure have 
not yet been fully adjudicated in the courts”). 
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Each of these endeavors is distinct from the other four. Each calls for a 
different regulatory regime. Below is a sketch of what those regimes might 
look like. While they borrow from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
principles developed here fill a void because, to date, that jurisprudence has 
had little to say about Cloud searches. Until the courts weigh in more 
definitively, policymakers are working pretty much on a clean slate in this 
area. 
 
I. SUSPECT-DRIVEN CLOUD ACCESS-PROPORTIONALITY 
 
 Assume the police receive an anonymous phone call from a female 
claiming that John Slade, a fifth-grade public-school teacher, is also a drug 
dealer. In investigating this claim, police might want to obtain Slade’s 
phone records to see if he has called known drug dealers, gang members, or 
drug users. They might also seek access to his bank records to discover 
whether the amount of money he deposits is consistent with his job as a 
school teacher. Additionally, the police might like to find out from GPS 
records and drone and camera feeds if Slade frequents areas of town where 
drugs are routinely sold.  
Under current Fourth Amendment and statutory law, none of these 
policing moves requires a warrant or probable cause and, depending on the 
jurisdiction, some of them may not even require a subpoena. That lack of 
regulation is abetted by the Supreme Court’s assertion that expecting 
privacy in information surrendered to a third party or in activities carried 
out in public is unreasonable.16 Yet most people surveyed on these matters 
come to a quite different conclusion, ranking perusal of their bank and 
phone records, for instance, as comparable to search of a bedroom, and 
ranking location tracking as similar in invasiveness to a frisk.17 On a more 
philosophical plane, scholars argue that allowing the government to invade 
databases so easily offends not only privacy, but autonomy and dignity.18 
                                                          
16 See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414; United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) 
(no expectation of privacy in public). 
17 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 112 tbl. (compare items 14 and 16), 184 tbl. 
(compare items 24 and 25). This research has been replicated in Christine S. Scott-
Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require Secrecy?: Societal 
Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2015); and Jeremy E. 
Blumenthal, Meera Adya & Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy: 
Testing “Lay” Expectations of Privacy, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 345 (2009).  
18 See, e.g., David Lametti, The Cloud: Boundless Digital Potential or Enclosure 
3.0?, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 190, 196 (2012) (“[W]e may be witnessing another round of 
‘enclosure’ in Cloud space that might have serious deleterious effects on what we have 
come to expect in the digital age: autonomy, exchange, spontaneity, and creativity, and all 
at a lightning pace.”). 
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They also claim it chills citizens’ rights to expression and association, and 
creates huge potential for abuse; after all, knowledge—which The Cloud 
provides in troves—is power.19 
The Supreme Court itself has begun to recognize these concerns. In 
Riley v. California,20 despite centuries-old precedent permitting 
suspicionless searches of any item found on an arrested individual, it 
required a warrant for a search of a cell phone of an arrestee, in recognition 
of the fact that “the cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of 
information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—
that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record.”21 In United 
States v. Jones,22 five members of the Court concluded that a Fourth 
Amendment search occurs when the police engage in “prolonged” tracking 
of a vehicle using GPS signals. While neither Riley nor Jones involved 
database access, Justice Sotomayor may have summed up where the Court 
is going when she stated in her concurring opinion in Jones that “it may be 
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. 
This approach is ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great 
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of 
carrying out mundane tasks.”23  
On this view, government would not be foreclosed from perusing, at its 
discretion, blogs, tweets, public records, and other sources that are clearly 
meant to be consumed by the public. But it would prohibit police from 
accessing, in the absence of justification, non-public Cloud data people 
generate when they engage in “mundane tasks” like communicating with 
their friends, banking, and shopping. It would also prohibit suspicionless 
access to tracking data about everyday travels that the average person 
undertakes on the assumption of practical anonymity.  
In short, there is a strong case to be made for requiring the government 
to demonstrate it has good reason to go after Cloud-based information about 
a particular person that is not readily available in public fora. Then the 
question becomes how good that reason must be. Normally, the Fourth 
Amendment requires that a search be based on probable cause, which 
amounts to a “fair probability” that a search will discover evidence of 
                                                          
19 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and 
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1461 (2001) (“The problem 
with databases is ... a problem that involves power and the effects of our relationship with 
public and private bureaucracy—our inability to participate meaningfully in the collection 
and use of our personal information.”).  
20 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
21 Id. at 2489. 
22 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
23 Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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crime.24 Return to the investigation of Slade. If the caller had identified 
herself and provided detail about Slade’s drug deals, perhaps the police 
would have had probable cause and grounds for a full-scale digital search. 
But recall that, in fact, the caller was anonymous and simply said Slade was 
selling drugs, thus making it difficult to dismiss the possibility that she was 
a disgruntled student or a spurned lover. Under Supreme Court case law, 
that call, by itself, would not permit a traditional search.25  
But suppose instead that the call, although anonymous, provides detail 
about John’s next drug deal. While, by itself, this would not be enough for 
probable cause, its predictive quality does provide an additional indication 
of reliability.26 In that intermediate situation, police arguably have 
“reasonable suspicion” (a lesser level of cause but one that nonetheless 
requires an articulable reason to act).27 In that scenario, police might still be 
prohibited from requisitioning the capacious digital record described above. 
But perhaps they would be justified in seeking more limited transactional 
data, say information about whether, near the predicted time, Slade calls a 
particular number or heads toward a particular location. 
This measured approach to accessing The Cloud is based on what 
might be called the proportionality principle.28 Under traditional Fourth 
Amendment rules, an arrest requires probable cause, but a short detention 
only reasonable suspicion; similarly, a full search of the person requires 
probable cause, a frisk only reasonable suspicion.29 Analogously, 
significant invasions of privacy on The Cloud—obtaining a month’s worth 
of bank records or Internet logs, or as the Supreme Court itself suggested in 
Jones, travel records that track a person for four weeks30—might require 
cause about the target akin to that necessary to search a home or car. 
However, less significant invasions—accessing records about a single 
phone call, credit-card purchase, or car trip, pulling up an identity using 
facial-recognition technology, or tracking a car for a few hours—could be 
justifiable on something less. Not only does this type of proportionality 
principle better reflect the degree of the government’s intrusion, it also 
avoids the Catch-22 of requiring police to demonstrate probable cause 
                                                          
24 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 114–15 (3d ed. 2007). 
25 See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a frisk based on 
an anonymous phone call stating that the defendant would be standing on a street corner 
wearing certain clothing with a gun on his person).  
26 Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (holding police had probable cause based 
on an anonymous letter that provided considerable predictive detail, but only after some of 
the detail was corroborated by police).  
27 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
28 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, ch. 2. 
29 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–27. 
30 Jones, 565 U.S. at 403. 
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before carrying out the preliminary investigative techniques they need to 
develop it.  
Proportionality reasoning makes sense in the abstract. But it presents 
difficult line-drawing problems. What justification do police need if, rather 
than seeking data about Slade’s financial transactions or travels over the 
course of a month, they want only a week’s worth of data? Or if they want 
to ascertain, in combination, whether Slade calls a particular number, visits 
a particular location, and deposits a large amount of money during a given 
month, but seek no other information about him?  
Answers to these types of questions will inevitably produce somewhat 
arbitrary classifications. Sometimes the answer might be categorical. That 
was the angle the Supreme Court took with respect to searches of home 
interiors carried out with sophisticated technology; in Kyllo v. United 
States, the Court held that all such searches require probable cause.31 
Government access to Cloud data that is analogous to the interior of the 
home—for instance, private documents stored on The Cloud, or 
communications on a closed social network—should receive similar 
categorical protection.32  
Once data leaves such confines, however, an across-the-board warrant 
requirement for accessing personal information overprotects the interests at 
stake, as both the Court’s cases and people’s views on the matter suggest.33 
One approach is to differentiate between types of information. Perhaps 
medical records would receive the most protection, bank records something 
less, utility records something less still.34 Current federal law appears to 
adopt this approach with respect to communications, with subscriber 
information receiving minimal protection, phone numbers and e-mail 
addresses receiving more protection, stored communications even more, 
                                                          
31 533 U.S. 27, 37–38 (2001) (involving thermal imaging of the home). 
32 Some have argued that encrypted material should receive similar, or even absolute, 
protection, simply by virtue of being encrypted. But given the fact that anything, including 
impersonal business records, can be encrypted, proportionality reasoning would suggest 
that the government should be able to force decryption of any material for which it has the 
requisite cause. The encryption debate is too complicated to address in this limited space. 
See Hugh J. McCarthy, Decoding the Decryption Debate: Why Legislating to Restrict 
Strong Encryption Will Not Resolve the “Going Dark” Problem, 20 J. INTERNET L. 1 
(2016) (detailing practical problems and domestic and international legal issues associated 
with different approaches designed to permit government decryption). 
33 See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 (2008) (presenting survey data indicating significantly 
different “intrusiveness ratings” depending on the type of record accessed). 
34 For an effort in this vein, see AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS (3d ed. 2013), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/thir
d_party_access.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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and interception of communications requiring probable cause.35 But the 
intuition upon which this scheme is based is suspect: For instance, a 
month’s worth of “metadata” about a person’s contacts may reveal much 
more than the transcript of a conversation.36 Similar comments can be made 
about other types of data: Bank records, credit-card statements, and utility 
logs can all be more or less private depending on the person and the context.  
In these circumstances, an alternative or supplemental proportionality 
approach might rely on durational or aggregational limitations. In Jones, 
five members of the Court distinguished between “short-term” and 
“prolonged” tracking.37 Similarly, the Court has indicated that, while a 
physical seizure lasting less than 15 minutes usually requires reasonable 
suspicion, a longer seizure amounts to an arrest requiring probable cause,38 
and an arrest must be judicially reviewed within 48 hours.39 One might limit 
Cloud searches of non-public data outside the home context the same way, 
on the theory that the more one learns about a person—from whatever 
source—the more intrusion occurs. For instance, obtaining information 
about the transactions of someone like Slade on a particular day or over a 
couple of days might be permitted on a relevance showing, but seeking data 
shadowing his activities over more than a 48-hour period or with respect to 
several different days might require greater suspicion and a subpoena from 
a judge, and obtaining a month’s worth of transactions could require 
probable cause and a warrant. While this duration-based rule also has 
administrability problems,40 it has the benefit of simultaneously protecting 
privacy in a roughly proportionate manner and permitting government to 
build its case without requiring probable cause from the outset. Ultimately, 
policymakers applying proportionality reasoning to suspect-driven Cloud 
access might choose rules based on a combination of record-type and 
aggregation considerations. 
Even if one finds this type of reasoning persuasive in the abstract, it 
might be resisted in the specific context of national-security investigations. 
                                                          
35 See supra notes 1–4 (citing relevant statutes). 
36 See Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet Upends 
Katz, Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 92 (2016) (given 
technological developments, “[t]he concept of metadata as a category of information that is 
wholly distinguishable from communications content and thus deserving of lower privacy 
protection is no longer tenable”).  
37 Jones, 565 U.S. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
38 See generally United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 684–88 (1985). 
39 Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). 
40 Compare Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. 311 (2011) (describing some of the problems); with Christopher Slobogin, Making 
the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of 
Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 24–30 (2012) (providing a model 
statute implementing mosaic theory).  
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Where national security is at stake, the argument goes, any significant 
limitation on Cloud usage should be jettisoned. But this stance should be 
viewed with skepticism. “National security” is an extremely broad term, 
and it has too often been a blank check for government abuse.41 Concrete 
threats to the country might justify departure from the rules that normally 
govern domestic law enforcement; for instance, if there is a demonstrable, 
significant, and imminent danger, relaxation of the justification required by 
proportionality reasoning might be permissible in this context. But 
otherwise the National Security Agency and like government entities should 
probably be treated no differently than other law enforcement agencies.  
 
II. PROFILE-DRIVEN CLOUD ACCESS-HIT RATES  
 
 Profile-driven searches are very similar to suspect-driven searches. 
The difference is that suspect-driven searches start with a person thought to 
be engaged in wrongdoing and then go to The Cloud, while with profile-
driven searches the government has no particular suspect when it seeks out 
Cloud data; rather it utilizes a profile describing the characteristics of likely 
perpetrators that it hopes will identify wrongdoers. Again using John Slade 
as an example, imagine that the police focus on him not because of an 
anonymous tip but because of a drug-dealer profile developed with the help 
of computer scientists and criminologists. Such a profile might be 
composed, let’s say, of five factors having to do with travel, spending, and 
communication patterns. Or, similar to how credit-card companies identify 
theft and fraud, the profile might purport to tell police when and where a 
drug deal is occurring or is soon likely to occur, which allows them to 
conduct surveillance of that spot and perhaps nab a perpetrator. Analogous 
to how researchers have developed risk-assessment instruments for pretrial 
detention and sentencing purposes,42 these profiles would initially be based 
on analysis of drug-dealer characteristics and behavior, and then cross-
validated on new populations or locations. 
Profiling using data accumulated from Cloud-related sources, 
sometimes called “predictive policing,” is in its infancy. But police 
departments appear to be committed to developing the necessary tools.43 
                                                          
41 See generally Erik K. Yamamoto, White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must 
Compel the Courts to Hold the President Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285 (2005).  
42 See e.g., Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Jay Whetzel, The Development of an 
Actuarial Risk Assessment Instrument for U.S. Pretrial Services, 73 FED. PROBATION 33 
(Sept. 2009). 
43 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 
U. PA. L. REV. 327, 352–88 (2015); Jeffrey Fagan, “Race and the New Policing,” in the 
present Report. 
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Such profiles are only useful, of course, if the government has access to 
databases that have the information needed to run the profile. Whether it 
should have such access is discussed below (under program-driven Cloud 
searches). Assume for now the data is available to government officials.  
As with suspect-driven Cloud searches, the analysis of profile-driven 
Cloud inquiries should involve determining whether the justification is 
proportional to the intrusion. In other words, the profile must produce a “hit 
rate” equivalent to the certainty required by the proportionality principle. If 
one equates probable cause with approximately a 50% hit rate, a profile that 
correctly identifies a drug dealer only 20% of the time would not authorize 
use of a profile that accesses multiple intimate data sources. But it might 
justify use of a profile that relies on arrest records, gang member lists, and 
other public or quasi-public data.  
Achieving even a 20% rate may be impossible for most crime 
scenarios, however; certainly social scientists engaged in the analogous 
pursuit of predicting dangerousness for sentencing purposes have struggled 
to achieve such accuracy. There are scores of variables associated with 
criminal behavior, and the prognostic power of any given variable or 
combination of variables is likely to be very low. Further, profiles will 
probably need to be updated routinely, either because of naturally occurring 
changes in criminal behavior or because perpetrators get wind of the factors 
in the profile. When one adds to those challenges the fact that much of the 
information about individuals found on The Cloud is unreliable,44 profiles 
that might justify apprehending specific suspects will be few and far 
between, at least if police action based on such data abides by the 
proportionality principle.  
Assuming that profiles with acceptable hit rates can nonetheless be 
developed, a second limitation on profile-driven Cloud use is that it should 
be transparent. To avoid profiles concocted after the fact, allow perusal of 
hit-rate data, and ensure that those individuals who are targeted using a 
profile actually meet it, profiles must be accessible to courts and other 
oversight entities, at least on an in camera basis (i.e., in chambers, outside 
the presence of the public). Transparency also assures that the factors on 
which profilers rely are vetted to ensure that illegitimate ones, such as those 
that are racially discriminatory, are not influencing the results.  
This vetting process could become difficult if, as occurs in some 
commercial contexts, profiles rely on complex algorithms generated 
through opaque machine-learning techniques or protected from disclosure 
for proprietary reasons.45 Complicating matters further, risk factors such as 
                                                          
44 See Ferguson, supra note 43, at 398–99. 
45 See Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Algorithms, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 883–86 (2016). 
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criminal history, location, and employment may turn out to be proxies for 
race, class, and related traits, use of which are generally considered 
anathema in police work.46  
These concerns do not have to be paralyzing, however. For instance, 
profiles that are indecipherable could be banned in the law enforcement 
context, regardless of their accuracy,47 or can be designed to ensure 
“procedural regularity.”48 Steps can also be taken to alleviate the concern 
that some risk factors correlate with race as well as crime. For instance, 
developers of algorithms designed to detect potential hot spots or 
perpetrators could be directed to avoid arrest records for low-level or drug 
crimes that might reflect race-based policing practices; instead, developers 
can be told to rely on reports of crimes (for hot-spot profiles) and on crimes 
of violence or on property crimes (for suspect profiles), so as to reduce the 
influence of racially-discriminatory arrest rates for drug crimes and 
similarly bias-susceptible offenses.49 It is also important to remember that 
traditional policing often relies on the same suspect, static factors, in ways 
that are inevitably more intuitive, and therefore less discoverable and more 
subject to invidious manipulation. Transparent algorithms that can produce 
the relevant hit rates and that avoid obviously illegitimate variables are very 
likely to be an improvement.50  
To limit further the extent to which bias creeps into the process, 
however, a third limitation that should be imposed on profile-driven Cloud 
searches is the maxim that everyone who fits a given profile must be treated 
the same. That means if a drug-dealer profile with the relevant hit rate 
                                                          
46 See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. 
REV. 671 (2016). For discussions of race and policing, see David A. Harris, “Racial 
Profiling,” in the present Report; and Devon W. Carbado, “Race and the Fourth 
Amendment,” in the present Report. 
47 See Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, Regulating Inscrutable Systems (2017) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (identifying increasingly difficult-to-
interpret approaches to algorithms, beginning with “decision tree” logic and ending with 
“deep learning” artificial intelligence).  
48 See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017) 
(sketching how computer programs can be constructed to ensure fairness and procedural 
regularity despite the black box nature of machine learning). 
49 Cf. Michael Feldman et al., Certifying and Removing Disparate Impact, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE 
DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 259 (2015) (discussing similar moves in connection with 
hiring algorithms). 
50 See, e.g., Sharad Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in the Age of Big 
Data, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181 (2017) (using stop and frisk data from New York City to 
create a risk profile that predicted who would be carrying a weapon 83% of the time; also 
finding that factors like “furtive movement,” a common police justification for stops, was 
not related to weapon possession and that, of those stopped using the profile, whites were 
much more likely than blacks to have a weapon).  
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identifies 200 people, police should not be able simply to single out 
someone like Slade but rather would either have to investigate everyone 
who fits the profile or, if that is not feasible, select individuals on a neutral, 
pre-specified basis (e.g., every third person). In the absence of this 
limitation, attempts to avoid illegitimate discrimination in construction of 
the profile will merely reappear at the post-profile investigation stage.  
 The added advantage of this third limitation on profile-driven actions 
is that it would make law enforcement think twice before engaging in them. 
Profile-driven searches will produce a large number of false positives, no 
matter how good they are. If, for instance, the predicted hit rate is 50%, half 
of those investigated are likely to be innocent, whether the police go after 
everyone identified by the algorithm or only a neutrally selected subgroup. 
Even if the post-profile police work is covert, much investigative energy 
will be expended with no gain. And in those situations where the 
investigation of those who meet the profile involves overt searching or 
seizing, a non-trivial number of false positives are likely to complain. 
Although the quantified, objective nature of profile-driven Cloud searches 
offers many advantages over traditional suspect-based techniques, their 
dragnet nature may end up being so practically or politically unpalatable 
when used to identify “persons of interest” that police abandon them.  
 
III. EVENT-DRIVEN CLOUD ACCESS-HASSLE RATES 
 
 Some Cloud searches conducted by law enforcement start not with a 
suspect or a profile of a likely suspect, but with an event—usually a 
crime—and use Cloud data to try to figure out who perpetrated or witnessed 
it. Let’s return to the example of John Slade, but this time as a victim rather 
than a potential suspect. Imagine that at 2 a.m. one Sunday morning, police 
are called to the scene of a homicide, a dark urban street, where they find 
Slade dead, drugs strewn around him. A medical examiner says the death 
probably occurred two hours earlier, around midnight. Pre-Cloud, the police 
would probably go door to door talking to those who live in the immediate 
vicinity, some or all of whom might claim—honestly or not—to have been 
elsewhere at the relevant time or to have seen or heard nothing. In contrast, 
today police might access phone or vehicle GPS records, as well as feeds 
from surveillance cameras with face-recognition or night-vision capacity, to 
identify people or cars near the crime scene at the time it happened, and 
then use suspect-driven techniques to zero in on the perpetrator.51  
                                                          
51 Baltimore has used videos from plane cameras to “TiVo” backward from the scene 
of the crime to determine how individuals and vehicles got there. See Monte Reel, Secret 
Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move from Above, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 
23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secret-surveillance/. 
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 These event-driven uses of The Cloud could result in a large haul of 
people, among whom may be the perpetrator or a witness, but many of 
whom will be neither. At the same time, all that this “data dump” learns 
about any of these individuals is that they were near a particular place at a 
particular time, a discovery that proportionality reasoning would suggest 
requires little justification. Even so, the scope of the government’s Cloud 
inquiry should probably be limited, to reduce both the extent of the initial 
privacy invasion and the number of people subject to further law 
enforcement inquiry. In other words, the government should minimize what 
Jane Bambauer calls the “hassle rate”—the proportion of innocent people 
subject to police investigation in an effort to find the one or two bad 
people.52  
What that rate should be will depend on the likely number of people 
involved. In effect, an admonition to limit hassle rates is simply a call to 
shape event-driven searches around the relevant time and place. In 
investigating Slade’s death, for instance, police should be able to find out 
the identity of and question pedestrians and car drivers near the scene of the 
crime shortly before or after midnight (assuming the medical examiner’s 
assessment is correct). But perhaps the police should not be able to 
investigate people who never approached the scene closer than 50 yards or 
who were there before 11:30 p.m. or after 12:30 a.m.  
The Cloud facilitates immensely the ability of investigators to carry out 
event-driven inquiries. Such inquiries can be quite broad, limited only by 
the imagination and priorities of law enforcement (because they are not 
limited by current law, at least in most jurisdictions). In contrast to the hit 
rates required for profile-driven Cloud searches, acceptable hassle rates for 
event-driven Cloud searches are not easy to establish, and should probably 
vary with the type of information sought and the type of crime being 
investigated.53 If the law is called into play here, perhaps the best that can 
be done is to require police to seek authorization for such inquiries from a 
judge, who can take potential hassle rates and these other factors into 
account in determining whether and to what extent event-driven Cloud 
searches may occur.  
 
 
                                                          
52 Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461 (2015). 
53 In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court held that the analysis should consider 
“the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure 
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” 
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004) (upholding a roadblock at the time of day and 
the place of a hit-and-run accident committed one week earlier, set up to find possible 
witnesses).  
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IV. PROGRAM-DRIVEN CLOUD ACCESS-DEMOCRATIC AUTHORIZATION 
 
Suspect-driven, profile-driven, and event-driven Cloud searches all rely 
in varying degrees on access to multiple databases, ranging from those that 
keep track of communications and travels to those that house records of 
financial and social transactions. From law enforcement’s perspective, 
keeping these databases within their separate silos is, at the least, inefficient 
and, in the case of profile-driven Cloud access, perhaps fatal, since profiles 
usually only work when they can access several databases at once. It was in 
recognition of this fact that the Defense Department proposed, post-9/11, 
the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program. According to a chart 
prepared by the Department of Defense, TIA was meant to gather in one 
place a huge array of transaction information concerning, according to the 
official description, “financial, educational, medical, veterinary[!], entry 
[i.e., immigration and customs], transportation, housing, ... and 
communications” activities, as well as all government records.54 Once 
collected, these data would be combed using algorithms designed to detect 
terrorist activity. Congress, apparently not enamored of this idea, defunded 
TIA in 2003 (by voice vote).55 But if Edward Snowden is to be believed, 
several programs in operation today, run by the NSA or other government 
agencies, bear at least some resemblance to it.56  
As the public reaction to Snowden’s revelations indicates, a significant 
proportion of the citizenry is uncomfortable with these types of programs. 
Compilation of information from multiple sources in one “place” raises a 
host of concerns. As recent exposés of foreign machinations highlight, 
aggregation of data facilitates hacking and identity theft.57 It also leads to 
“mission creep,” as law enforcement realizes that information obtained for 
one reason (such as fighting terrorism) might be useful for other purposes. It 
can easily lead to more obvious abuses, ranging from illegitimate 
investigations of journalists, politicians, activists, and members of certain 
                                                          
54 See Total Information Awareness, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_Information_Awareness (last updated July 14, 2017) 
(depicting a chart purporting to have been prepared by the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency). 
55 See 149 Cong. Rec. S1379-02, S1416 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2003). 
56 See Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects “Nearly Everything a User 
Does on the Internet,” THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data. 
57 See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth & David Gelles, Russian Hackers Amass over a Billion 
Internet Passwords, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/technology/russian-gang-said-to-amass-more-than-a-
billion-stolen-internet-credentials.html. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947948 
16 
 
ethnic groups to leaks based on personal vendettas.58 Most prominently, it 
tempts the government to combine all of the information it has collected to 
create “personality mosaics” or “digital dossiers” about each of its citizens, 
a phenomenon classically associated with totalitarian states.59 
In part because of the public reaction to Snowden’s disclosures, the 
NSA supposedly no longer collects metadata and must now seek it through 
subpoenas from the relevant common carriers, in the suspect- and profile-
driven manner described earlier.60 But the NSA and other federal agencies 
continue to aggregate other types of data.61 Localities and states also engage 
in the data-collection enterprise. For instance, New York City’s Domain 
Awareness system, co-created by the city’s police department and 
Microsoft, collates information gleaned from thousands of closed-circuit 
surveillance cameras (CCTV), and combines it with geospatial data that 
reveals crime “hot spots,” feeds from license-recognition systems, and GPS 
signals that permit real-time and historical tracking of cars.62 A number of 
other cities operate large-scale CCTV systems, and many are also moving 
toward 24/7 drone or plane surveillance.63 A different type of program, 
known as a “fusion center,” exists in more than half the states. These 
centers—over 75 at last count, some with more than 200 personnel—“fuse” 
financial, rental, utility, vehicular, and communications data from federal, 
state, and local public databases, law enforcement files, and private 
company records for investigative purposes.64  
                                                          
58 For some examples involving activists, journalists, members of minority groups 
and so on, see Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, The Self, the Stasi, and the NSA: 
Privacy, Knowledge, and Complicity in the Surveillance State, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. TECH. 
347, 347–80 (2016). 
59 Daniel Solove popularized the term “digital dossiers,” which he described as the 
aggregation of data to create “a profile of an individual’s finances, health, psychology, 
beliefs, politics, interests, and lifestyle” that “increasingly flows from the private sector to 
the government, particularly for law enforcement use.” Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers 
and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2004). 
60 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101, 129 Stat. 268, 269-71 
(2015). 
61 Zack Whittaker, Freedom Act Will Kill Only One of NSA’s Programs (and Not 
Even One of Its Worst), ZERO DAY (May 4, 2014), http://www.zdnet. com/article/ freedom-
act-metadata-phone-records-prism/#!.  
62 See Colleen Long, NYPD, Microsoft Create Crime-Fighting “Domain Awareness” 
Tech System, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2013).  
63 See Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2013); Marc J. Blitz et al., Regulating Drones under the First and Fourth 
Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49 (2015). 
64 See THE CONST. PROJECT, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUSION CENTERS: PRESERVING 
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE PROTECTING AGAINST CRIME AND TERRORISM 4 
(2012), www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.  
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These program-driven efforts, which have been called “panvasive” 
because they invade the records of large swaths of the population, occur 
with the foreknowledge that most of those affected have done nothing 
wrong.65 Thus, this collection of data cannot be regulated through 
suspicion-based proportionality reasoning. Arguably, however, it does not 
need to be. Until the data are accessed by humans and used as a means of 
investigating or identifying particular people like Slade, no concrete 
intrusion has occurred. Only when such access does occur will government 
officials need to demonstrate the cause necessary to carry out suspect-, 
profile-, or event-driven searches.  
For those who do not trust government to abide by such strictures, one 
further protection, illustrated by Congress’ changes to the NSA’s metadata 
program, would be to require that all databases be maintained outside the 
government. Even profile-driven Cloud searches could be carried out by a 
private entity, with the government providing the profile and the company 
providing the government only with the identities of those who meet it. 
While this arrangement would still present some of the problems associated 
with aggregation (hacking and the like), it would undoubtedly reduce the 
potential for mischief by government officials.  
In the end, however, this attempt to separate government from data 
cannot work. Many of the databases useful to Cloud searches—those that 
house CCTV feeds, the data from highway tracking systems, and the 
billions of personal records relevant to criminal history, taxes, entitlements, 
real-estate transactions, and scores of other matters—would not exist but for 
the government. The executive branch needs this information for all sorts of 
legitimate reasons, some related to crime prevention and many that are not. 
Government should not be prohibited from collecting and maintaining it. 
Instead, regulation of program-driven Cloud searches must come from 
the political process.66 Given Congress’ docility toward executive-branch 
surveillance proposals after 9/11, that suggestion may seem naïve. But 
legislatures are capable of action in this area, as the defunding of TIA and 
the revamping of the NSA’s metadata program illustrate.67 Especially when, 
as is the case with many types of Cloud-based efforts, the program affects 
significant segments of the population—including members of the 
                                                          
65 See Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and 
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721 (2014).  
66 Id. at 1745–58. 
67 Other examples are state statutes that limit the use of drone surveillance and federal 
statutes limiting access to various types of records. See Michael L. Smith, Regulating Law 
Enforcement’s Use of Drones: The Need for State Legislation, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 423, 
427–32 (2015) (cataloguing state drone statutes); Murphy, supra note 5, at 546 (appendix 
detailing federal laws). 
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legislature and their most powerful constituents—some type of political 
oversight is not only possible but likely. 
At the same time, it must be admitted that law enforcement and tough-
on-crime lobbies are a forceful presence at both the federal and state levels 
and may be able to exert influence that the populace as a whole cannot. That 
is where the courts could come into play, in two ways. On rare occasions, 
courts might declare a particular data-collection scheme unconstitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment. However, given the Supreme Court’s narrow 
definition of the word “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes and its 
high level of deference even to programs that it is willing to say involve 
searches (under what it calls its “special needs” jurisprudence68), that 
outcome is not likely in the near future.  
A second way courts might nudge legislatures and law enforcement 
agencies toward a balanced view—and one that would operate 
independently of the Fourth Amendment—is by applying the same “hard 
look” analysis they apply to programs created by other administrative 
agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug 
Administration.69 While law enforcement departments have seldom been 
subject to the type of judicial monitoring to which other agencies routinely 
submit, that lack of oversight is likely a historical accident rather than a 
considered policy. The full argument for why courts are obligated to engage 
in such oversight will not be set out here.70 For present purposes, it suffices 
to say that, where program-driven, panvasive operations are involved, a 
solid case can be made that the courts should treat police agencies the same 
way they treat other agencies that are engaged in creating rules governing 
the circumstances under which people may carry out innocent conduct.  
That conclusion has several consequences. First, under accepted 
administrative law principles, no agency program that affects the rights and 
obligations of the citizenry may exist unless the agency can point to 
authorizing legislation that, ideally, sets out the harm to be prevented, the 
persons and activities likely to be affected, and the general means for 
preventing the harm. That would mean that before programs like New York 
City’s Domain Awareness operation and the states’ fusion centers can come 
into being, municipal, state, or federal legislatures would have to think 
through the types of information they can obtain and for what purpose. That 
                                                          
68 For a description of this jurisprudence, see Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra 
note 65, at 1727–33. 
69 See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Judicial Review and the “Hard Look” Doctrine, 7 NEV. 
L.J. 151, 154–59 (2006) (discussing the Administrative Procedure Act and associated case 
law establishing the hard look doctrine). 
70 See Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91 
(2016); see also Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, “Democratic Accountability and 
Policing,” in the present Report.  
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requirement of legislative authorization, enforced by the courts, would 
ensure at least some democratic assessment of such programs and how they 
should operate. 
The impact of administrative law principles would not end there, 
however. Standard practice dictates that, once authorized to set up a 
program, an agency must draft implementing rules, subject them to a notice-
and-comment process (or something similar) that allows public input, and 
provide written rationales for the rules ultimately chosen—rules that are 
reviewable by a court to ensure they are consistent with the legislative 
delegation and that they are applied even-handedly, without irrational 
distinctions between groups or areas.71 This further injection of democratic 
input and judicial oversight would exert significantly more pressure on 
police departments to consider competing views when contemplating the 
creation of a data-collection scheme. Regulated through this type of public 
process, it is likely that TIA-like programs, fusion centers, and other 
panvasive practices would be significantly curtailed or implemented with 
more care. 
The even-handedness requirement, designed to prevent biased data 
collection, is particularly important, so important that some have argued it 
should also be enforced through equal protection doctrine.72 It would call 
either for universal or random data collection (as suggested above in 
connection with profiles) or for proof that uneven information collection is 
justified statistically. For instance, this principle might demand that CCTV 
camera systems be established citywide or, alternatively, everywhere within 
the city that has similar reported crime rates. Metadata collection would be 
nationwide, random, or based on algorithms with high hit rates. And DNA 
database programs focused on arrestees, like the one authorized by the 
Supreme Court,73 would be hard to justify without some proof that arrestees 
are significantly more likely to commit crimes than the general 
population.74  
One possible drawback to the political-process approach to program-
driven Cloud searches is that its transparent nature will enable the bad guys 
to learn the ins-and-outs of the programs and how to avoid them. But this 
traditional law enforcement concern, which administrative procedure acts 
specifically recognize as legitimate,75 is exaggerated in this setting. The 
                                                          
71 Slobogin, Policing as Administration, supra note 70, at 144–45.  
72 Barry Friedman & Cynthia B. Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The 
Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 327–43 (2016). 
73 Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301 (2012).  
74 Andrea Roth, Maryland v. King and the Wonderful, Horrible DNA Revolution in 
Law Enforcement, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 295, 308–09 (2013) (explaining the virtues of a 
universal DNA database).  
75 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2012). 
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primary aim of most panvasive actions is deterrence, which publicity can 
only enhance. Further, matters of specific implementation need not be 
revealed. For instance, if camera surveillance is meant to be covert, the fact 
and general area of such surveillance should be disclosed, but exact camera 
locations need not be. The types of records sought by fusion centers should 
be revealed, but the algorithms that might be used to analyze them could be 
viewed in camera. Ultimately, however, the primary response to the tip-off 
concern is that democratic accountability requires that the public be told not 
only what panvasive capacities police have but how those capacities will be 
used.  
 
V. VOLUNTEER-DRIVEN CLOUD SEATCHES-FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 
 
All of the foregoing Cloud searches involve government-initiated 
investigations. The assumption throughout this paper has been that when the 
government decides to intrude, some justification is necessary. But what if a 
data-holder—a bank, a common carrier, or hospital—comes across 
information it thinks is indicative of criminal activity and wants to hand it 
over to the police? While the discussion thus far has suggested several 
reasons why government should not be able to demand information from a 
third party without justification, the situation is clearly different when the 
third party comes forward of its own accord.  
Even so, it is important to recognize that not all volunteer-driven Cloud 
searches are alike. In the cases in which the Supreme Court first announced 
the third-party doctrine, the third party was a personal acquaintance of the 
defendant.76 Establishing a rule that the government must ignore disclosures 
from such people denigrates their autonomous choice to make the 
disclosures, and could even be said to undermine their First Amendment 
right to speech. Recall, for instance, the tipster in the hypothetical involving 
John Slade. Whatever that person’s motives and however that person 
acquired the information, the choice to divulge it deserves respect and 
should be considered a legitimate basis for government action if it has 
sufficient indications of reliability. 
However, in the Court’s later third-party cases, Miller v. United 
States77 and Smith v. Maryland,78 the third party was not a person but an 
institution, more specifically, a bank and a phone company. Historically, 
corporations have not been considered autonomous “persons” in most 
contexts and have also been accorded lesser First Amendment rights than 
                                                          
76 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293 (1966). 
77 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
78 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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natural beings.79 More importantly, unlike human confidantes, these 
institutions can be said to owe either formal or quasi-formal fiduciary duties 
to their customers, because unlike the human third party, they are able to 
obtain personal facts solely because they purport to provide a particular 
service.80 The most sympathetic example on point comes from the medical 
context, where a patient provides information to a treatment provider. Even 
the Supreme Court has balked at the notion that a hospital is entitled to 
ignore a patient’s expectation of medical privacy for the purpose of catching 
criminals.81 Arguably, an analogous position is warranted with respect to 
banks and phone companies, to which we give information for the sole 
purpose of carrying out financial transactions or communicating.  
Also important to recognize is that, when the third party is an 
institution, the degree to which information is “voluntarily” handed over to 
the government can vary greatly. In some cases, the government commands 
third parties to produce information about others, automatically and in the 
absence of a particularized court order. For instance, banks must report all 
deposits of $10,000, regardless of circumstances.82 If this sort of command 
is justifiable, it should be so only if it comes from the legislature and is 
generally applicable (as is true in the deposit scenario). More commonly, 
the government exerts subtler pressures on third parties to produce 
information. Most obviously, some data brokers, although purportedly 
private and independent of the government, essentially see the government 
as their client,83 and other companies, dependent on government largesse, 
may be especially eager to show they are helpful.84 Unless defined 
narrowly, volunteer-driven Cloud searches might ultimately even undo 
                                                          
79 The Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010), focused on political speech rights of corporations, which are not implicated in this 
context. Further, corporations are still not considered “persons” for Fifth Amendment 
purposes, see Hale v. Henkel, 210 U.S. 43 (1906); and have very weak Fourth Amendment 
rights. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).  
80 See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
611 (2015); SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 161 (arguing that recordholders have a fiduciary 
“duty of allegiance” to the subject of the record).  
81 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
82 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a).  
83 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other 
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. 
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 617–18 (2004) (describing the FBI's “secret, classified 
contract” with Choicepoint). 
84 Avidan Y. Cover, Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist Fourth 
Amendment, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1441, 1445 (2015) (“[T]echnology corporations are not 
likely to challenge government surveillance requests, and even less likely to make effective 
arguments asserting their individual customers’ rights, because of their government 
connections, the legal constraints on transparency and disclosure, and their immunity for 
complying with the government.”). 
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efforts, like the recent NSA legislation, to keep as much data as possible out 
of government hands. That phenomenon is worrisome, because people 
should be able to trust that the private institutions on which they depend for 
the basics of life are not conduits to the government.  
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that fiduciary obligations 
and concerns about corporate duplicity should not always trump speech 
rights and concerns about public safety. For instance, both the medical and 
legal professions recognize a duty to reveal information that would prevent 
a violent crime or forestall an ongoing one.85 Explicitly applied to The 
Cloud, that norm would permit third-party institutions to disclose, and 
government to use, information about others that is likely to prevent a 
serious violent felony from taking place in the near future. Arguably, 
however, that norm should be the full extent to which the law bows to the 
volunteer notion where third-party institutions that are essential to living in 
the modern world are involved.86 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Databases are full of information that can enhance law enforcement’s 
ability to detect and investigate crime and terrorism. Given the personal 
nature of much of this information, however, government should not be able 
to obtain, view, or use it at will. The following recommendations 
concerning law enforcement access to data arise out of the foregoing 
discussion.  
 
1. If a policing agency seeks non-public records about an identified 
person, it should have to demonstrate suspicion of wrongdoing 
proportionate to the intrusion involved. Whether or not courts 
modify current Fourth Amendment law to encompass such access, 
legislatures and agencies should require increasingly demanding 
justification requirements based on the nature of the data sought, the 
amount of data sought, or a combination thereof. 
                                                          
85 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (“A lawyer may reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary ... to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.4615(3)(a)  (“When a patient has declared an intention to harm 
other persons,” the therapist may release “sufficient information to provide adequate 
warning to the person threatened.”). 
86 This is the rule Congress adopted in connection with communications.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 2702 (c) (prohibiting  ISPs from disclosing communications to law enforcement 
except in emergencies involving death or serious physical injury and a few technical 
situations) 
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2. If a law enforcement agency is instead accessing data for the 
purpose of executing a profile to identify suspects, it should 
ensure the profile produces the requisite proportionality-derived 
hit rate, avoids illegitimate discrimination, and uses an 
understandable algorithm. Courts should evaluate these profiles, 
in camera if necessary, to ensure they are properly validated and do 
not rely on obviously biased risk factors. If the profile is used to 
identify suspects, police should not be able to choose whom among 
them will be subject to further investigation, but rather should be 
required to investigate all of those who meet the profile or, if that is 
not possible, a neutrally selected subset of that group.  
3. If policing agencies are relying on a crime rather than a suspect 
or a profile as the starting point of the investigation, the crime 
should be serious and the number of people investigated kept to 
the minimum dictated by the time and place of the crime. At 
least when the investigation is extensive, judges should be involved 
in evaluating the need for and scope of such investigations. 
4. Collections of data needed by law enforcement should be 
maintained outside of government to the extent consistent with 
governing needs, but wherever maintained they should be 
authorized by specific legislation and administrative rules 
transparently and democratically arrived at. Data-acquisition 
methods should be universal, random, or statistically justifiable. 
Courts should enforce these rules through either the administrative 
hard-look doctrine or equal protection analysis.  
5. Private institutions should be permitted to proffer to the 
government information about those to whom they owe a de 
facto fiduciary duty only when they have good reason to believe 
it would prevent an ongoing or future serious violent felony. 
Courts should scrutinize any government incentives, financial or 
otherwise, that encourage the transfer of information that normally 
would be subject to the foregoing access and collection limitations.  
 
These rules, accompanied by adequate accountability mechanisms that 
facilitate discovery of and sanctions for their breach,87 would allow the 
government to take advantage of The Cloud’s investigative potential while 
cabining the temptation to abuse it.  
                                                          
87 Such mechanisms might include: (1) an auditing process indicating who accesses 
data, when, and for what purpose; (2) notice, either individualized (in the case of suspect-
driven searches) or general (in other cases), detailing how Cloud access has occurred; (3) 
rules limiting data retention by the government or third parties; and (4) civil and criminal 
sanctions for wrongful collection or access. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 4, at 132-36.  
